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BOOK REVIEW

THEY CALL IT JUSTICE by Luther C. West, New York: The
Viking Press, 1977, pp. xii, 302. $12.95.
JOHN S. COOKE
Captain, JAGC, U.S. Army*
Military justice is not often the object of public attention. When it is, its
exposure usually results from a notorious case or incident, such as the My Lai
massacre or the "Presidio Mutiny" of the late 1960's. Even episodes like these
afford the casual observer only a fragmented view of military justice, since attention is typically focused on events ancillary to the criminal process itself.
Consequently, many people perceive military justice as something of a
dinosaur in modem jurisprudence; to much of the public "drumhead justice"
is synonymous with military justice.
Unfortunately, Luther West's book, They Call It Justice,1 will do little to
change this image or to further the public's understanding of military justice.
Indeed, the book attempts to capitalize on the public's misconceptions by sensationalizing and distorting some aspects of the system. The one-sided picture
that results obscures any realistic treatment of a legitimate and important
issue: to what extent should commanders, and military personnel directly
responsible to commanders, control the military justice system?
The commander's role in the administration of justice in the military has
long been a source of controversy2 and continues to be debated to the present
day. 3 Courts-martial began as instruments of discipline; only later did they
take on attributes of a criminal justice system. 4 Since commanders were
responsible for discipline, they became responsible for the administration of
justice. Over the last half century, however, many of the commander's powers
in the military justice system have been restricted or removed,5 and this trend
*Assistant Professor of Law, The Judge Advocate General's School, Army, Charlottesville,
Virginia. The opinions and conclusions expressed in this review are those of the author and do
not necessarily represent the views of the The Judge Advocate General's School or any other
governmental agency.
1L. WEST, THEY CALL IT JUSTICE (1977), [hereinafter cited as L. WEST].

2See Ansell, Military Justice, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1919), reprinted in MIL. L. REv.
BICENTENNIAL ISSUE 73 (1975); Hansen, Judicial Functions for the Commander?, 41 MICH. L.
REv. 1 (1968).
3See Cooke, The United States Court of Military Appeals. 1975-1977: Judicializing the
Military Justice System, 76 MIL. L. REv. 43 (1977); see also Fletcher, The ContinuingJurisdiction Trial Court, THE ARMY LAWYER, Jan. 1976, at 5.
4See generally J. BIsHoP, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE, 1-15 (1974); W. WINTHROP. MILITARY LAW

AND PRECEDENTS 45-56 (2d ed. 1920). This is not to say that military law in antiquity was
without structure and form, only that its framework was designed to achieve discipline. See
Stuart-Smith, Military Law: Its History, Administration and Practice, 85 LAW Q. REv. 478
(1969), reprinted in MEL. L. REV. BICENTENNIAL ISSUE 25 (1975).
5See Douglass, The Judicializationof Military Courts, 22 HAST. L.J. 213 (1971); Hansen,
supra note 2.
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continues today.6 Nevertheless, based upon his own experience, as well as his
study of the military justice system, West advocates not only the removal of
the commander from the military justice system, but also the removal of the
military from military justice, or, in essence, the removal of the justice system
from the military. Though rational support for such a radical solution to the
controversy has been presented elsewhere 7 West fails to make the case for it
in his book.
West's look at military justice is highly personal. Beginning in 1950, he
spent seventeen and a half years on active duty as an Army lawyer in the
Judge Advocate General's Corps. Most of the book consists of anecdotal accounts of cases in which he was involved or which he observed while on active
duty or as a civilian after his retirement in 1968. Interspersed with these narrations is a brief description of the history of command control in the military
from World War I to the mid-1960's. This historical discussion is a condensed
and less evenhanded version of a lengthy law review article on the subject
written by West in 1970.8 The book concludes with the assertion that military
personnel are incapable of administering a truly just criminal system, and a
recommendation that everyone in the military justice system, except military
jurors, be replaced by civilians.
West's criticism of military justice rests primarily upon his own experiences in dealing with the system, as a service member and a civilian.
Each of us is, of course, wedded to the truths of his or her own experience.
Refutations of opinions of this nature are therefore muffled by the walls of
subjectivity. This author, as either a defense counsel or a prosecutor, has
never encountered the abuses described by West; nor has he in discussions
with literally hundreds of other military lawyers, heard of abuses on the scale
described. This is not to say that such abuses never occur, nor, that the
potential for abuse is not present. However, it is incorrect to describe commanders and military lawyers as "grossly dishonest in the administration of
military justice." 9 Unfortunately, such hyperbole marks many of the pages of
the book.
Beyond this largely meaningless standoff in personal experience, some
observations about West's judgments are in order. West describes several
means by which commanders have affected the results of courts-martial. The
most common method was the practice of communicating with court
members (jurors) in a manner which suggested what results were desired in
certain cases.1 0 The force of West's criticism of such practices is blunted,
however, by his own willingness to manipulate proceedings to suit his own
6See
Cooke, supra note 3.
7

See, e.g., Sherman, MilitaryJustice Without Military Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1938 (1973).
West, A History of Command Influence on the MilitaryJudicialSystem, 18 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 1 (1970).
9
L. WEsT. supra note 1, at 12.
0
I This procedure was finally prohibited in 1969. Id. at 107.
8
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purposes. For example, West recalls a contested case in which, just as the
court members were about to retire to deliberate, defense counsel West found
it appropriate to make "an 'administrative' announcement.""1 He told the
court members, in effect, that the last flight out of the remote Korean village
where the case was being tried would depart in half an hour. Since a conviction would necessitate further proceedings to adjudicate sentence,
anything other then a very fast acquittal would require all court members to
spend the night at Kowon," a fate which West described as "a very dismal
prospect." 1 2 The court members quickly acquitted West's client and caught
their flight to Seoul. In West's opinion, this case "...reflects
military justice
in its best light.""3
On another occasion, West, again as defense counsel, cited to a courtmartial several state cases in support of a position on the law, but opted not
to bring to the court's attention federal cases, of which he was aware, which
contradicted his position, deciding " . . . that that was a distinction which
would have to be researched by the prosecutor." 1' With this deviously eclectic
method of argument' 5 West secured an acquittal by persuading a jury of layment (who could in those day overrule the law officer on a question of law)
that his position was correct. Of this occasion, West writes, "To me, there is
16
no greater than this in the practice of law."

West's proud description of such questionable stratagems reflects that his
concern over manipulation of the system hinges on who is doing the
manipulating. To be sure, the commander's unique position may render him
capable of more pernicious influence than a defense counsel can exercise,
even when the latter uses gambits on the fringes of ethical conduct. Nevertheless, West's willingness to bend the rules to his ends should suggest that his
vantage point is a highly egocentric one. His is not a detached view of the
system.
Indeed, West exhibits distaste not only for military justice; he clearly expresses his disdain for the military as a whole. He indicates that he harbored
"resentment against the officer corps generally"1 7 as a result of his experience
as an enlisted man in World War II,and that he rejoined the Army reluctantly in order to support his family. He felt that many officers "chose to remain in military service rather than join the competitive world of civilians.""
Obviously, little happened to change his opinion of the military during the
next seventeen and a half years.
Uid.
at 71.
2

' 1d.
"Id.

"Id. at 4. It should be noted that a court-martial is a federal forum.
"See
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 7-106(B) (1975).
6
' L. WEST, supra note 1, at 4.
7
' 1d. at 5.
'Bid.
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The chapters dealing with cases with which West was connected as a
civilian, following his retirement in 1968 should be read with his opinion of
the military in mind. Among those discussed are the cases (or non-cases)
resulting from the My Lai massacre, and several incidents arising out of dissent or protest against the war in Vietnam, or against racial injustices. There
can be no denial of the many unhappy consequences of the war in Vietnam
or of the phenomenon of racism. The forces and events surrounding the war
and racial discord left many eddies of divisiveness and tragedy in their wake
in the late 1960's and early 1970's. The military, and military justice, were
far from immune from the effects of these forces; indeed, the military was at
the center of the storm in many instances. West goes too far, however, when
he casts military justice as the only tear in what was a major rent in the social
fabric of this country.
West asserts that military justice broke down during the war. In his opinion, the military justice system was not used to handle widespread dissent
because "it did not work to restore discipline."' 9 While observation may be
true, West in no way documents his claim that "the military threw in the
sponge," 20 and did not attempt to discipline its dissidents. Given this nation's
acutely schizophrenic attitude toward the war, the military justice system was,
by itself, incapable of reversing opposition to the war. To some extent, this
may be because military justice is no longer a mere instrument of discipline
to be used to bludgeon erring service members into blind submission. West
fails to address the present function of the military justice system, nor does he
adequately describe how a completely civilianized military justice system
would have handled this disciplinary problem any better.
With respect to the My Lai cases, West asserts that Lieutenant William
Calley was made the scapegoat for the tragic events at My Lai village and
their aftermath, pointing to the heavy interest in the case at top levels of
command, as well as the fact that Calley was the only individual convicted of
any offense in connection with the massacre, as evidence of some form of
conspiratorial design to shift "total responsibility for the massacre"'" to
Calley. That there was interest in the case from the highest levels of government, and that Calley was the sole individual convicted in connection with
My Lai are true. It does not follow from this that the military justice system
22
inadequately handled the affair.
Charges were brought against numerous individuals in connection with
My Lai. In some cases, charges were dismissed for lack of evidence, in others,
acquittals resulted. 23 In discussing two of these cases, those of Captain Ernest
"Id.

at 279 (emphasis in original).

21Id. at 278.
2'Id. at 212.
22See generally Cooper, My Lai and MilitaryJustice-To What Effect?, 59 MIL. L. R~v. 93
(1973). But see T. TAYOR. NuREMBERG AND VIETNAM (1970).

"Cooper, supra note 22, at 94-102. A number of individuals alleged to have participated in
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Medina and Colonel Oran Henderson, West acknowledges that the evcidence
introduced against each of these officers was not compelling; it is hard to
fault either jury for acquitting either man. Yet he implies that the prosecution pulled its punches in these cases, though little more than speculation is
presented in support of this insinuation. It is difficult to understand how such
a last ditch attempt at a final cover-up could have in fact occurred. The My
Lai incident was extensively investigated not only by Army criminal investigators and prosecutors, but by a congressional subcommittee and, independently, by a panel of Army offices under appointment by the Secretary
of the Army. 24 Significantly, the House Armed Services subcommittee found
that while there was a failure to make "adequate, timely investigation" immediately after the massacre, the Army ultimately "overreacted by recommending charges in several cases where there was insufficient evidence to warrant such action." 25 It seems unlikely that with all the scrutiny to which the
My Lai prosecutions were subjected, Army officials could have whitewashed
the case by holding back evidence in the prosecutions of Medina and Henderson.
My Lai exposed a serious breakdown in the Army's training and
discipline. While ultimately criminal liability attached to William Calley
alone, it is inaccurate to say that he alone was responsible for the event. The
conduct of others, while either not rising to the level of criminal guilt, or being beyond the reach of court-martial jurisdiction, 26 contributed to the event.
The incident brought discredit upon the Army as a whole. The record
reflects, however, that in the wake of this horror, the military justice system
was used responsibly and with appropriate zealousness.
Perhaps the most glaring flaw in the book is its neglect of recent
developments in the military justice system. Even if everything West described
were true, its germaneness to a discussion of military justice today would be
questionable. Copyrighted in 1977, the book treats no events more recent
than 1972, and most of its attention is focused on the 1950's and 60's.
Moreover, interspersed in West's description of his own experiences is his
discussion of the history and development of military justice from World War
I to the mid-1960's. The image presented by this telescoping of the near and
the atrocity at My Lai could not be prosecuted because they had been discharged from the

military. Once a service member is discharged, he or she may not constitutionally be subjected to
court-martial jurisdiction. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1954). There was

no crime for which they could be tried in civilian courts, for there were no statutes applying to
this conduct which have extraterritorial effect. Any other disposition would have been questionable. See Cooper, supra note 22, at 104-09. This result calls for some legislative remedy to

avoid similar occurrences in the future. Given the constitutional limitations on courts-martial,
any solution
will fall outside the realm of military justice.
4
2Cooper,
supra note 22, at 97-99.
5

2 ARMED SERVICES INVESTIGATING
CONG., 2D SESS.,

SUBCOMM. OF THE COMM. ON
ARMED SERVICES. 91ST
INVESTIGATION OF THE MY LAI INCIDENT, REPORT UNDER H.R. REs. 105, at 4

(Comm.
Print 1970).
26See note 23, supra.
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distant past is an "afterminded" 27 look at military practices as though they
survive today. Yet the sweep of the lens through which West directs our gaze
is such that the most recent developments in military justice are not seen.
Whatever truth is filtered to us through this distorted glass, it must be weighed
against the knowledge that, just as when looking at the stars, we are seeing
what was years ago, but may not still be there now.
The picture presented by West is not pretty. During World War I commanders has such complete authority over courts-martial that they could
order retrial of a case which resulted in acquittal and could, without further
review, order a death sentence executed. As late as the 1960's, commanders
could engage in what in civilian life would be jury tampering by communicating with military jurors about matters likely to come before them.
Powers like these affront most of us today, but it is important to remember
that they were, at the times in question, legal. The court-martial procedures
of yesteryear were, as they are today, prescribed by Congress, 28 implemented
by the President, 29 and have historically been given great deference by the
judicial branch.30 It is true that the military has generally had substantial input into these procedures, but ultimately determination of the nature of the
military justice process rests with civilians.
But some of the practices which West discusses were illegal when they occured. This is true, for example, of the practice of giving a defense counsel a
noncompetitive efficiency rating, on which prospects for advancement rest
because of his zeal or success in defending cases. This practice and related
ones3" appear to have subsided in recent years; 32 nevertheless, undeniably the
potential for abuse is great when an individual's advancement and assignment
prospects are in the hands of one with whom he is often engaged in an adversarial relationship. For this reason, in 1972 recommendations were made to
the services to remove defense counsel from under the direct supervision of
local commanders and their staff judge advocates. 33 The Navy and Air Force
have implemented such programs and the Army appears likely to do so within
the near future. Thus, while the problem West describes does not seem quite
so rampant as he makes it appear, the potential for it, and the very invidiousness of it when it does occur, are causing reform of the system with the
goal of eliminating this evil. While such an independent defense structure
27

See Cam, Introduction to F. MAITLAND, SELECTED

1957).

HISTORICAL ESSAYS at xix (Cam ed.

8

See UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE arts. 1-140, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970).

25

See

50

MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL. UNITED STATES at iii, (1969 rev. ed.).

See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975); Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103

(1950); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897).
"Such as reassignment out of defense duties, possibily to an undesirable assignment, or
other forms of harassment.
SIStill, they may not have been entirely eliminated. Allegations of unfair treatment of
counsel were made by some lawyers involved in the West Point Honor Code case of 1976.
defense
53
See 1 REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE
ARMED FORCES 81-84 (1972).
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may not entirely solve the problem,3 4 West's failure to even recognize the
significant changes that have occurred undercuts the validity of his criticisms.
Also out of date are the criticisms of the United States Court of Military
Appeals .3 While on the whole West wholeheartedly approves of the existence
of this civilian court at the top of the military justice appellate system, he
launches some of his heaviest criticism at the court, charging that it failed to
eradicate command influence by taking a clear and consistent stand against it
durirfg the court's early years. He also chastises the court for failing to make
more effective use of its power under the All Writs Act36 to closely scrutinize
military justice practices outside the ordinary appellate process. West should
have taken a more recent look at the court and its work.
CMA has taken a strong stand against any sort of command influence or
tampering with the judicial process, and has indicated that it will use
whatever powers it has to preserve the integrity of the system. 37 Recently, the
court has moved resolutely to judicialize military justice,3 8 making numerous
changes during the past two years, many of which have restricted or removed
powers previously exercised by commanders. For example, a commander can
no longer reverse a military judge on a question of law.39 Decisions made by a
commander which affect the administration of justice are subject to review by
the judiciary,40 and often must be accompanied by a statement of reasons in
order to be sustained. 4' A commander's decision to impose pretrial confinement must now be reviewed by a magistate. 42 A commander's determination
of the availability of witnesses is subject to de novo review by a judge. 43 A
pretrial agreement, entered into between the accused and the convening
"4While a defense counsel may be independent while he or she is in an independent defense
structure, such an individual is dependent on those outside this structure for certain things like
promotion and reassignment. Moreover, it would be unusual for an individual to remain in such
an independent structure for too long. There is always the possibility that one will someday work
for someone with whom he must "lock horns" as a defense counsel. Such pressures cannot be
totally eliminated as long as defense counsel wear the uniform. This does not necessarily mean,
however, that civilianizing the system would be better, for other problems may be created
thereby.
"5Hereinafter referred to as "CMA" or "the court" in text.
$628
U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970).
3

MJ.

-

1See United States v. Ledbetter, 25 C.M.A. Adv. Sh. 51, 54 C.M.R. Adv. Sh. 51,
(1976).

-

"3See Cooke supra note 3.
"9United States v. Ware, 24 C.M.A. 102, 51 C.M.R. 275, M.J. (1976).
40See, e.g., United States v. Dunks, 24 C.M.A. 71, 51 C.M.R. 200, M.J. (1976);
United States v. Ledbetter, 25 C.M.A. Adv. Sh. 51, 54 C.M.R. Adv. Sh. 51, M.J. (1976).
41See e.g., United States v. Quinones, 23 C.M.A. 457, 50 C.M.R. 476,
(1975); United States v. Keller, 23,C.M.A. 545, 50 C.M.R. 716, M.J. States v. Hardy, 4 M.J. 20 (C.M.A. 1977).
4Courtney v. Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87, 51 C.M.R. 260, M.J. 4United States v. Carpenter, 24 C.M.A. 210, 51 C.M.R. 507, M.J.
United States v. Ledbetter, 25 C.M.A. Adv. Sh. 51, 54 C.M.R. Adv. Sh. 51,

(1976).

-

M.J.
(1975); United

(1976).
-

(1976); cf.
M.J. -
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authority must be reviewed thoroughly by the trial judge44 and may not contain conditions requiring the accused to give up rights other than those nor4
mally waived by plea of guilty. "
CMA has also expanded its own supervisory role over military justice.
West's disappointment over the court's failure to use its extraordinary writ
powers should have been alleviated by the court's action in McPhail v. United
States."6 There CMA held that it has authority to act to correct fundamental
injustice in any court-martial, whether or not the court's ordinary appellate
jurisdiction could ever extend to such a case. CMA has used its extraordinary
writ authority to revise pretrial confinement procedures, 47 to suggest broader
powers of the trial judiciary over such matters as defense preparation, 4" and
has even hinted that it has authority to review administrative matters. 4" CMA
has also used it supervisory power to change other rules governing the system.
It has, for example, changed military pleading requirements,50 the military
5 2
standard for insanity,51 and the bases for pretrial confinement
While descriptions of these and other recent developments in military
justice may not generate the same interest as the lurid details of "command
fraud," any serious study of military justice is incomplete without them. It is
unfortunate that West has obscured an important subject by immersing the
subject of command control in the froth (and stale froth at that) of sensationalism.
For over half a century the path of military justice has moved away from
command control and toward a truly judicial system. A court-martial today is
highly similar to a criminal trial in a federal or state court. The powers of a
trial judge in the military have been equated to those of a federal judge,53
although there are differences, to be sure.5 4 The Court of Military Appeals
has indicated its desire to enhance the authority and autonomy of the
military judiciary as much as possible within the present limitations of the
4"United States v. Green, 24 C.M.A. 304, 52 C.M.R. 10,
- M.J. (1976); United
States v. King, 3 M.J. 458 (C.M.A. 1977).
4United States v. Holland, 23 C.M.A. 442, 50 C.M.R. 461, M.J. (1975).
4624 C.M.A. 304, 52 C.M.R. 15,
- M.J.
- (1976).
47Courtney v. Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87, 51 C.M.R. 260, M.J. (1976).
4'Halfacre v. Chambers, Misc. Docket No. 76-29, MJ. (13 July 1976).
4'Harms v. United States Military Academy, Misc. Docket No. 76-58, M.J.
- (10
Sep 1976).
5
United States v. Alef, 3 M.J. 414 (C.M.A. 1977).
6
Unitd States v. Frederick, 3 M.J. 230 (C.M.A. 1977).
"United States v. Heard, 3 M.J. 14 (C.M.A. 1977).
M.J.
53See Courtney v. Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87, 91, 51 C.M.R. 260, 264, (1976) (Ferguson, J., concurring); Stevenson, The Inherent Authority of the MilitaryJudge, 17
A.F.L.54 REv. 1 (1975).
For example, a military judge has limited contempt power, see McHardy, Military Contempt Law and Procedure, 55 MIL. L. REV. 131 (1972); a military judge cannot suspend a
sentence which he adjudges, see United States v. Occhi, 25 C.M.A. Adv. Sh. 93, 54 C.M.R. Adv.
Sh. 93 (1976); perhaps most significantly, a military judge has no power to act except when a
court-martial is convened, and a court-martial can be convened only by an appropriate commander. See U.C.M.J., arts. 22-24, 39a. But see Stevenson, supra note 53, at 16.
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Uniform Code of Military Justice. The court also on record as favoring certain amendments to the UCMJ to further increase the judicial role.5 5 Chief
Judge Fletcher of the court has advocated that lawyers and judges administer
military justice entirely, with but two exceptions:5 6 In the interest of military
necessity, the Chief Judge would permit a commander to direct, after a
preliminary investigation, that a case not go to trial. He would also permit a
commander to exercise a clemency function after conviction.
West would go further then Chief Judge Fletcher and others57 who advocate the removal of the commander from any direct role in the administration of military justice; he would remove all military personnel from military
justice. Because he feels that military lawyers are as much to "blame" for
military justice as are commanders, West would turn the entire process over
to civilians; the only features of the present system which he would retain are
the Court of Military Appeals (already comprised of civilians) and the drawing of jurors from the. military.
There are potential problems in such an approach which West either
glosses over or ignores and which can be summed up in a single word:
responsiveness. How responsive to the unique needs of military society would
a system of justice adminstered entirely be civilians be? The military is a far
flung, highly mobile society. Military efficiency as well as discipline depend
upon the prompt adjudication of innocence or guilt. Would a civilian court
system, even if devised to serve only the military, be able to fulfill these requirements, even in a relatively stable peacetime environment? Today, if
troop relocation or a change in crime rates occurs, military lawyers can be
relocated or reassigned with relative ease to handle the problem. Could the
military expect the same degree of responsiveness form a civilian structure?5"
Practical problems like these must make one think twice about completely
civilianizing the trial of military cases. It must be conceded, however, that
these problems alone do not justify a separate system of military justice if the
military cannot maintain a just system.
The real inquiry should focus on a more fundamental issue. West
obscures this inquiry with his ad hominum attacks on commanders and
military lawyers, but the fundamental issue which must be addressed is the
"See, e.g., United States v. Ledbetter, 25 C.M.A. Adv. Sh. 51, 59, 54 C.M.R. Adv. Sh.
2
51, 59, MJ. - .
- .
n.1 (1976) (recommending tenure for all judges in the military

justice system); United States v. Carpenter, 24 C.M.A. 210, 212, 51 C.M.R. 507, 509, M.J.
I, n.8 (1976) (recommending that the military judge, rather than the convening
authority, have power to subpoena witnesses.
5
OSee Fletcher, supra note 3, at 6.
57
See e.g., Schesser and Benson, A Proposal to Make Court-Martial Courts: The Removal
of Commanders From MilitaryJustice, 7 Tax. TECH. L. Rxv. 559 (1976); Bayh, The Military
Justice Act of 1971; The Need For Legislative Reform, 10 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 9 (1971).
5
"There is an additional problem overseas. Some countries may not wish to permit civilian
courts of the United States to operate on their soil. Transporting witnesses and defendants to and
from the United States would be cumbersome and expensive. But see Sherman, supra note 7, at
1422.
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relationship of the commander to the justice system. While commanders and
lawyers generally approach their roles in military justice with honesty and integrity, the commander's overall role places undeniable pressures upon him
and those who work for him. The commander is responsible for enforcing the
law in his command. This inherent personal interest in the maintenance of
order is antithetical to the neutrality and detachment normally expected of
those who exercise judicial functions. The weight of the commander's
authority is respected by all military personnel; that weight can exert a
gravitational pull which can affect the judgment of others, even when that
judgment is supposed to be exercised independently.
The purpose of the military justice system cannot be ignored, however.
Like any system of criminal law, military justice is intended to enforce and
reinforce the values and goals of the society to which it applies. Significant in
the military's values is not only respect for the rights of others, or society
generally, but respect for authority. Accomplishment of unpleasant or
dangerous tasks depends on respect for those superiors who order that such
tasks be undertaken. The military is, after all, an authoritarian organization.
The other side of this authoritarianism is the commander's responsibility
for all that goes on in his or her organization. The operation of the military
justice system, as an enforcer and reinforcer of the values desired by the commander, affects what goes on in that organization. The authoritarian structure in the military rests in large measure on the assumption that commanders know best the needs and capabilities of their organization and how
to accomplish its mission. It cannot be forgotten that an effective fighting
force is an unfortunate necessity in this world, without which the rights we all
enjoy might be rendered meaningless. Looked at from the perspective of
organizational efficiency, the commander's role in military justice is
justifiable.
The commander's role in military justice must be evaluated in light of the
unquestioned necessity for justice. A discourse on the nature of justice is
hardly appropriate here. Suffice to say that human nature being what it is,
the appearance of justice is critical to accomplishing justice. Essential to this
goal is the diffusion of decision making to preclude arbitrariness and the
allocation of it to decision makers with no direct personal stake in the result.
The commander's role in military justice collides with these requirements.
The following questions thus remain: (1) to what extent should military
justice be responsive to the commander's needs, and (2) what procedures are
necessary to make it so? Answers to these questions are not scientifically ascertainable, but that is not to say the inquiry should not be undertaken. Indeed,
the inquiry is ongoing, albeit in a less than systematic fashion. It seems fair to
begin with the principle that whatever powers the commander retains he
should have because they are essential to ensure that the needs of the command will not be ignored and he should have these powers only where there
exists adequate assurance that the interests of the individual will be recognized
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and properly protected. Where such assurance does not exist, as where the
commander's powers are nothing more than the vestigial remains of some
ancestral limb, they should be amputated. The military justice system today
is vastly different from the one of fifty, twenty-five, or even ten years ago,
and has significantly changed in just the last five years. Rather than engage
in the kind of careful, objective study necessary to the continuing of military
justice, West opts to kill the beast and be done with it.

